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I.

INTRODUCTION

Visits to the hospital, particularly for an emergency, are often fraught with anxiety and apprehension for both patients and accompanying family members. It is not
unimaginable to think however, that for a patient who feels terrible enough to go to
the emergency room, it may be a relief to turn control over to medical professionals.
The chance that a doctor might make a mistake might cross a patient’s mind; at that
moment, however, the patient must trust that the doctor will not. But people, and
particularly systems, are fallible; it can be easy to misread a number on a script or
pick up the wrong vial. When mistakes happen, patients may be angry, or worse,
injured. Some patients will want to sue. Whether or not a patient decides to sue, all
healthcare consumers want the provider to identify and correct the error. Society as
a whole is invested in making sure that the mistake does not happen again to someone
else.
Healthcare providers are equally invested in correcting errors. In part, this investment is a result of the complex federal and state regulatory structure that governs
their activities.1 One example of this regulatory complexity can be found in the differing state laws that require reporting of errors made by healthcare providers. These
incident reports help providers analyze failures that have led, or may have led, to
patient harm, and are part of an ongoing debate about error disclosure, patient rights,
and quality of health care.2 In some states, incident reports are statutorily granted
nearly complete confidentiality.3 Yet in other states, patients have been granted full
access to incident reports, including those that were previously held to be confidential.4 Recent federal legislation grants some additional protection to these reports of
error. Incident reporting is an extremely important piece of the improvement of the
quality of the healthcare system, but can only be effective if the information is consistently privileged.
This note argues that the confidentiality of incident reports must be guaranteed
in order to satisfy the concurrent and different needs of providers, regulators, and
patients. This argument is not new. As early as 1993, researchers proposed various
model legislative schemes creating separate or additional privileges for incident re-

1.

Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War over the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege on the Business of
American Health Care, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 301, 304 (2006) (“Few areas of endeavor are
steeped so deeply in labyrinthine regulations and convoluted statutory provisions as American health
care . . . .”); see also Michelle M. Mello, Carly N. Kelly & Troyen A. Brennan, Fostering Rational
Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 375 (2005).

2.

The term incident report can refer to many types of reports, some of which will be discussed in Part II
below. For the purposes of this note, an incident report is a report that either describes or analyzes a
medically related incident that occurred within the course of a patient’s care, such as a medication error
or a wrong site surgery, and is used for purposes either internal to a hospital or for external reporting to
a regulatory or accrediting agency. This note generally will not consider intentional harm to patients or
a facility’s accidents, such as a chair that breaks underneath a patient in a waiting room. See, e.g.,
Berggren v. Saint Vincent’s Catholic Med. Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., No. 10129/04, 2004 WL 2903641, at *1
(Sup. Ct. Richmond County Dec. 13, 2004).

3.

See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2008); Megrelishvili v. Our Lady of
Mercy Med. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (1st Dep’t 2002).

4.

See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. X, § 25.
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ports beyond those that already existed.5 In 2005, Congress enacted the Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act (“PSQIA”), a federal law designed to encourage
reporting of patient safety work product6 by providing an incentive of confidentiality
to those who report to specific patient safety organizations.7 This new protection
still does not go far enough. Incident reports will continue to be disclosed and errors
will still plague our healthcare system.8
Part II of this note provides a broad background of the confidentiality generally
given to a hospital’s quality assurance process and the privileges that have traditionally been applied to quality assurance material. It then focuses more narrowly on
incident reports and compares current confidentiality statutes in two states that represent different ends of the disclosure spectrum, Florida and New York. Part III will
5.

See generally Cynthia Dollar, Note, Promoting Better Health Care: Policy Arguments for Concurrent Quality
Assurance and Attorney-Client Hospital Incident Report Privileges, 3 Health Matrix 259 (1993)
(proposing a model rule for use by states to create a hospital incident report privilege); Jason M. Healy,
William M. Altman & Thomas C. Fox, Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care
Information, 40 Brandeis L.J. 595 (2002) (proposing model legislation to provide incentives and
method for the reporting of quality information to the federal government by a specific group of
institutions).

6.

Patient safety work product is defined in the new law’s proposed regulations as “any data, reports,
records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written or oral statements (or copies of
any of this material)” which is ultimately contributed to a patient safety evaluation, or reporting, system.
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 8112, 8120 (proposed Feb. 12, 2008) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3).

7.

See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Public L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 299b-1 to c-6 (2000 & Supp. 2005)); Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8112, 8113. The analysis of medical errors will be held confidential if
disclosed to a certified patient safety organization, but such protection is separate from and does not
cover information gathered for a provider’s own internal investigation purposes or for purposes related
to required reporting to regulatory and accrediting agencies. Id. at 8123.

8.

Steven E. Pegalis, A Proposal to Use Common Ground That Exists Between the Medical and Legal Professions
to Promote a Culture of Safety, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1056, 1063 (2006) (citing Lucian L. Leape &
Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384,
2384–90 (2005)) (noting that five years after the initial Institute of Medicine’s report on medical errors,
progress in patient safety improvements was very slow); see also Brent C. James, Prologue: Five Years
Later—Are We Any Safer?, in 1 Advances in Patient Safety: From Research to implementation
1, 1 (2005) (“[A]s a country, progress has fallen far short of the IOM’s ambitious goal. Some members
of the original IOM committee have publicly decried the lack of substantial progress . . . .”) (citing D.M.
Berwick, Op-Ed., Invisible Injuries, Wash. Post, July 29, 2003, at A17; J. Morrisey, Patient Safety
Proves Elusive, Mod. Health, Nov. 2004, at 1, 6–7, 25, 30, 32); Health Grades, The Fourth
Annual Health Grades Patient Safety in American Hospitals Study  (April 2007), http://
www.healthgrades.com/media/DMS/pdf/PatientSafetyinAmericanHospitalsStudy2007.pdf (“Despite
the flurry of research, publications and process improvement activity that has occurred since the IOM
report, there is a growing consensus that not much progress has been made leading to a visible national
impact. Our findings support this consensus.”). A Health Grades study of patient safety in U.S.
hospitals using Medicare hospitalization records between the years 2003 and 2005 found that 1.16
million patient safety incidents had occurred in that timeframe, and that 247,662 patient deaths could
have been prevented. Id. at 4. It should be noted, however, that the reliability of the Health Grades
study has been called into question for a number of reasons. See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting
Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15
Health Matrix 329, 346–48 (2005).
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examine the risks of non-confidentiality and contrast these risks with the rationales
for disclosure. Finally, Part IV will argue that the use of incident reports should be
limited to their intended purposes—that of research by a hospital into its processes
for the purposes of improvement and satisfaction of regulatory requirements, and
preparation for litigation—and not an additional tool for use by plaintiffs seeking
redress. Therefore, federal legislation must go farther to protect all incident reports,
including those that must be submitted to state departments of health.
II.

THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE ANALYSIS

A. Confidentiality in the Quality Assurance Process
Quality assurance is the term used for a healthcare provider’s review of its systems to improve patient safety and care.9 The confidentiality of quality assurance
review in the healthcare industry has a robust, if inconsistent, history. Confidentiality
is granted to quality assurance activities on the premise that without such a promise,
providers are less likely to participate or be truthful when participating in the quality
assurance process.10 Without truthful and open participation, there can be no genuine improvement.
Many industries, including healthcare, recognize that employees are more willing
to report errors if they know that their reports will remain confidential.11 It is recognized that the “mere fear of litigation due to disclosure of data is the greatest
barrier to reporting.”12 In addition to an apprehension of litigation, disclosure spurs
a fear of both reputational damage and professional sanctions.13 To further the
quality assurance process, which entails making sure less focus is placed on those
responsible and more is directed toward solutions, the trust of the potential reporters
must be earned. Dependable confidentiality goes far in earning such trust.
Since regulating health care has typically been the province of the states,14 state
law governs the confidentiality of medical peer review and quality assurance committees, as well as the reports and activities of those committees.15 State legislatures
9.

Dollar, supra note 5, at 264–66.

10.

Id. at 279–80.

11.

See, e.g., Dayna C. Nicholson & Lynsey A. Mitchel, A Medical Error Happened: Now What? The
Implications for Medical Errors Heat Up, 10 J. Health Care Compliance 5 (2008) (describing the oftcited model of aviation safety and improvements).

12.

Harrington, supra note 8, at 353 (citing Mimi Marchev, Nat’l Acad. for St. Health Pol’y, Med.
Malpractice and Med. Error Disclosure: Balancing Facts and Fears 2 (2003), http://www.
nashp.org/Files/Medical_Malpractice_and_Medical_Error_Disclosure.pdf).

13.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.

14.

Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, Doing What Counts for Patient Safety:
Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and Their Impact 10 (2000), http://www.quic.gov/
Report/errors6.pdf; see also Duggin, supra note 1, at 329.

15.

See generally Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n, Public Interest Colloquium, Minimizing Medical
Errors: Legal Issues in the Debate on Improving Patient Safety (2003); Duggin, supra note 1,
at 329–30.
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that enact laws granting confidentiality to the quality assurance process within hospitals seem to have accepted the concept that people may be more likely to disclose
errors if they are assured of confidentiality.16 Many states also provide confidentiality to the discussions and reports of committees internal to healthcare providers
whose job it is to review these quality assurance processes.17 Most often healthcare
providers, in many cases hospitals, have a medical peer review committee to look
after the medical staff as well as a type of quality assurance committee to monitor
quality of care.18
Medical peer review is the process through which hospitals credential (grant
privileges to) and evaluate the physicians who work for them.19 To be credentialed to
practice and treat patients at a hospital, a physician must provide the hospital with,
among other things, proof of his or her qualifications and competence, both initially
and then on a regular basis over the course of his or her tenure.20 Should the physician’s qualifications or competence be called into question, the peer review committee
will review the physician’s behavior and recommend measures to discipline or assist
the physician.21 For example, if a physician shows up to work intoxicated, the peer
review committee has the authority to investigate the physician’s reported behavior.22
The peer review committee has the power to suspend that physician or even revoke
his or her hospital privileges.23 Healthcare providers may also have quality assurance
committees, which are responsible for risk management processes, such as investi-

16.

See, e.g., Logue v. Velez, 92 N.Y.2d 13, 16–18 (1998).

17.

See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3).

18.

See, e.g., Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101–11152 (2000).

19.

See Steven Suydam, et al., Patient Safety Data Sharing and Protection from Legal Discovery, 3 Advances
in Patient Safety: From Research to Implementation 361, 365 (2005).

20. See Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From Tort Doctrine

Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1179, 1190
(2006) (citing Credentialing & Peer Review Practice Group of The Am. Health Lawyer’s
Ass’n, Peer Review Guidebook (3d ed. 2003)). Physicians who seek to be credentialed at a hospital
may have to provide additional information, such as disclosure of any conflicts of interest or evidence of
good physical health. Requirements vary from institution to institution. For a good overview of these
requirements as well as problems that physicians encounter with peer review committees, which in part
led to the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, see Pauline Martin Rosen,
Medical Staff Peer Review: Qualifying the Qualified Privilege Provision, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 357
(1993).
21.

Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 1190.

22.

See id. at 1190–91.

23.

Id. If a physician’s privileges are revoked, the physician cannot see patients at that hospital until the
privileges are reinstated. The physician is not precluded from seeking patients at another practice where
he or she has privileges and that is independent of the hospital. However, for behavior that compels a
revocation of privileges, there may be a concurrent state board of medicine investigation that may
ultimately determine whether the physician may keep his or her license to practice medicine. Id. For
examples of types of reporting and investigations beyond those initiated by hospital peer review
committees, see the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11137.
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gating accidents and other events that occur within the hospital.24 These committees
are found in particular at skilled nursing facilities and other places that treat Medicare
and Medicaid patients.25 These committees as a whole, not just at skilled nursing
facilities, are responsible for recommending changes to processes that have not been
working or that present a risk to patients.26
The purpose of providing protection for these processes is to ensure that the reviewers can perform their functions objectively and effectively.27 The state has an
interest in improving medical care—whether by monitoring and disciplining physicians, reporting incidents, or improving hospital systems.28 States therefore provide
for the protection of peer review and quality assurance committee records by statute,
although each state is different and protection in one state is by no means the same
as protection in another.29 For example, in one state the final outcome of a peer review hearing may be the only aspect of the review process that is kept confidential,
while in another state the entire process is protected from disclosure.30 In addition,
24.

Dollar, supra note 5, at 279–84.

25.

Healy et al., supra note 5, at 613. Quality assurance committees at skilled nursing facilities already play
a more significant role as the federal government has entered into Corporate Integrity Agreements with
several of these facilities to address quality issues within the institutions—such agreements are normally
associated with the federal government’s attempt to improve an institution’s billing issues. Id. at
611–61.

26. For a government-mandated implementation of a quality assurance committee, see U.S. Dep’t of

Health and Human Serv., Corp. Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen.
of the Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. and Green Valley Pavilion et al. 3 (May 2007),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/green_valley_pavilion_05012007.pdf (mandating
creation of a Quality Assurance Compliance Committee “to address issues concerning quality of care at
Green Acres’ nursing homes” and a Quality Assurance Monitoring Committee to, among other things
“review the adequacy of Green Acres’ system of internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, and
patient care”).
27.

See, e.g., Logue, 92 N.Y.2d at 16–18. In Logue, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the legislative
history behind two New York statutes that provide confidentiality to peer review and quality assurance
proceedings, finding that “[t]he purpose of the discovery exclusion is to ‘enhance objectivity of the
review process’ and to assure that medical review committees ‘may frankly and objectively analyze the
quality of heath services rendered’ by hospitals.” Id. at 17 (quoting Mem. of Assembly Rules Comm.,
Bill Jacket, L. 1971, ch. 990, at 6).

28. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 329–30.
29. Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the Holes in the

Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 346, 352 (2001) (“[S]tate-based peer review
statutes are quite variable in their coverage. Some state statutes cover some information; others, little;
still others, only information generated by particular providers, such as hospitals, while ignoring other
provider forms, such as managed care organizations.”); see also David H. Johnson & David W. Shapiro,
The Institute of Medicine Report on Reducing Medical Error and Its Implications for Healthcare Providers and
Attorneys, 12 Health Law. 1, 7–8 (2000) (“Unfortunately for confidentiality, these [peer review
privilege] statutes vary considerably in their reach and strength. Overall, this makes them a problematic
source of legal protection for error data . . . . The treatment of incident reports within an institution, for
example, varies by state.”). See generally Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care:
Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote Patient Safety, 3 Hous. J. Health
L. & Pol’y 219 (2003).
30. Dollar, supra note 5, at 283–84.
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as with the example of attorney-client privilege discussed below, disclosure of the
information with a third party during the peer review or quality assurance process
may constitute waiver of confidentiality. This can hamper the sharing of quality of
care information between healthcare institutions that seek to learn from each other’s
mistakes.31
Statute is not the only means by which quality of care information may be protected. If quality of care information is sought by an adversary during discovery,
providers may also rely on evidentiary privileges to protect the information. The
attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges may be invoked when the hospital’s attorneys have participated in the internal investigation of an incident and in
drafting an incident report.32 These privileges may be asserted concurrently with the
assertion of statutory peer review or quality assurance privilege and confidentiality.
Attorney-client privilege protects conversations between attorney and client.
The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”33 When such communication is guaranteed to remain confidential, a client may feel free to be completely
honest with his or her attorney, which allows the attorney to provide the best possible advice. When the client is a hospital, attorney-client privilege becomes a more
complicated issue, because the hospital is a corporation and acts through its agents.34
The question then becomes: to whom does this privilege apply?35 To determine
whose communications with an attorney are covered by the corporate attorney-client
privilege, courts have developed various tests, such as the control group test and the
subject matter test.36 In the control group test, the agents of the corporations who
were covered under the corporate attorney-client privilege were management-level
employees or officers representing the corporation who sought legal advice from
counsel on behalf of the corporation.37 The Supreme Court rejected the control
group test in Upjohn Co. v. United States, recognizing that the privilege existed not
just for an attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation but for an attorney to
31.

Suydam, supra note 19, at 362 (“One potential problem with such [regional safety consortia comprised
of member healthcare institutions] . . . was that free exchange of information between institutions may
render such information vulnerable to discovery by plaintiffs . . . by implied waiver of any peer review
privilege that might exist . . . .”).

32.

See generally Dollar, supra note 5.

33.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).

34. For an extensive examination and discussion of the corporate attorney-client privilege, see Vincent C.

Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191
(1989).
35.

See generally Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special
Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1169
(1997).

36. Id.
37.

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391–93.
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receive information about the problem facing the corporation.38 The Supreme Court
declined to establish an alternative test at that time.39 Another test, the subject
matter test proposed in Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, protects conversations
between an attorney and those employees, whether management or not, who had
something to do with the subject matter of the incident which led to the attorney’s
involvement.40 Whether in an individual context or in the corporate context,
attorney-client privilege can easily be waived by disclosure—purposeful or inadvertent—to a third party.
Attorney work-product privilege protects an attorney’s notes and other materials
created in anticipation of litigation, including an attorney’s thoughts and strategies.41
One author of a law review article described attorney work product as follows:
“[N]otes and other documents prepared by or for the organization’s attorneys as a
result of an internal investigation are protected, but only if the work is done in anticipation of litigation.”42 As recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these
materials are unavailable to an adverse party in litigation, except in cases of undue
hardship.43 Thus, it appears that attorney work-product privilege is not as broad as
attorney-client privilege because of the condition that it only covers material created
in anticipation of litigation.44
Problems can arise for hospitals when they attempt to use these evidentiary privileges to shield incident reports from disclosure during litigation. Examples of some
problems include: cases in which the hospital has provided an incident report to a
third party, such as an insurer or regulator;45 cases in which in-house hospital counsel
“wears more than one hat” in the organization and the court finds that in preparing
the incident report, counsel was acting in the capacity of business management, not
counsel;46 and cases in which a hospital’s policy is to create a report for each incident,
38. Id. at 390.
39.

Id. at 396–97.

40. 862 P.2d 870, 875 (Ariz. 1993) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.

1970), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)).
41.

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

42.

Gabriel Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques
to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 205, 215–16 (1999).

43.

In re Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3)).

44. See generally Imperato, supra note 42, at 212–19.
45.

See Liang, supra note 29, at 353 (“[E]rror and safety information must often be disclosed to third parties.
For example, information about errors resulting in an adverse event must be reported to a particular
state agency in roughly two dozen or so states and to JCAHO under its Sentinel Event Policy.”); Dollar,
supra note 5, at 259 (“The attorney-client privilege does not consistently protect incident reports because
they are prepared for other persons, such as liability insurers and hospital risk managers and quality
committees, as well as for the attorney.”).

46. Greg Radinsky, The Compliance Officer Conundrum: Assessing Privilege Issues in a Health Care Setting, 5

DePaul J. Health Care L. 1, 2–3 (2002). It should be noted that currently this conflict arises more
within the context of counsel who are also compliance officers at healthcare institutions. Compliance
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and the court finds a report to have been created in the ordinary course of business
rather than in anticipation of litigation.47 One researcher has expressed the concern
that, if others in management either direct the creation of or receive such reports, a
court may find that the privileges do not apply because the reports were not created
at the behest of counsel.48 In addition, the collaborative sharing of error reports
among hospitals for the purpose of enhancing each other’s knowledge and processes
may also waive the privilege because they are third parties.49 Overall, “[i]n the context of internal investigations, counsel often cannot rely with total confidence on the
most frequently invoked protections—the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine.”50 This inability to rely on well-established confidentiality
protections creates a serious impediment to accurate and thorough reporting, because
hospitals and physicians will be reluctant to fully disclose if they believe their reports
will end up in the hands of an adverse party.
The self-evaluative privilege is another privilege meant to protect a hospital’s
quality assurance review procedures.51 The self-evaluative privilege is similar to
statutory quality assurance privileges in that it is meant to shield internal review
analysis.52 To qualify for the privilege, the information must have come from critical
self-analysis, there must be public interest in having the practitioners engage in the
self-analysis, and that self-analysis would stop if the information were discovered.53
officers at healthcare institutions generally are responsible for ensuring that hospital bills, as well as
Medicare and Medicaid claims, are accurate and correct, and that there has been no fraud. However,
compliance programs for quality assurance have begun to make their way into the healthcare industry,
beginning with skilled nursing facilities as the federal government implements new quality assurance
compliance programs in these institutions with particularly vulnerable populations. Healy et al., supra
note 5, at 611–12. Therefore, this potential problem may become a more widespread issue if quality
assuarance compliance programs move into other federally funded healthcare institutions, such as
hospitals. To this end, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has “begun to utilize quality
factors as a basis for reimbursement decisions; the wave of the future is non-payment for medical care
related to an adverse event.” Nicholson & Mitchel, supra note 11, at 5.
47.

Dollar, supra note 5, at 279 (“When the reports serve more than one purpose, even if both purposes
serve important policies, the privilege is uncertain.”).

48. Id. at 274 (“Some courts have ruled that incident reports are not confidential communications because

they are made under the direction of the hospital’s internal administration, not just the attorney, and the
reports are delivered to hospital administrators and insurers.”).
49. See generally Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a

Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 155, 163–65 (2006) (describing how
attorney-client privilege is more easily waived than the work-product privilege, though both may be
waived by disclosure to a third party).
50. Thomas F. O’Neil & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primer for Health

Care Lawyers, 5 Annals Health L. 33, 34 (1996).
51.

See Dollar, supra note 5.

52.

Healy et al., supra note 5, at 628–29 (referencing Bredice v. Doctor’s Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.
1970), aff ’d, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which the court found that the public interest in allowing
hospitals to investigate a patient’s death outweighed disclosure).

53.

Imperato, supra note 42, at 216–17 (quoting Thomas F. O’Neil & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic
Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primer for Health Care Lawyers, 5 Annals Health L. 33, 37 (1996)).
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When reporting is not required and the review process is voluntary, researchers caution that even then “those portions of a written report that compile, organize, and
present all pertinent underlying facts nonetheless may well be disgorged, providing
opposing parties with an easy road map for proving their claims, as well as admissions of a party opponent that are extremely useful during litigation.”54 Despite its
potential utility and similarity to statutory quality assurance privileges, courts have
not universally accepted this privilege.55
Finally, there is selective waiver—the disclosure of conf idential,
privilege-protected information to a third party, such as a government regulator,
with the understanding that the disclosure should not be construed as full waiver.56
Sometimes the selective waiver doctrine is invoked if voluntary disclosure has been
made under a confidentiality agreement with an investigating government agency.57
In situations where the government is investigating fraud or billing claims, a hospital
may attempt to demonstrate its cooperativeness with the government by waiving its
privileges and disclosing confidential information in the hopes of receiving a reduction in penalties, but is not willing to share the confidential information with other
interested persons not party to the agreement.58 The difficulty with selective waiver
is that it is contractual and cannot bind third parties, so courts have found waiver, no
matter under what agreement, to be complete.59 Healthcare providers considering
whether to self-disclose to the government should not count on the doctrine of selective waiver to keep their incident reports confidential. 60 Healthcare providers,
therefore, may have statutory protection for quality of care information as well as
potential coverage by evidentiary privileges.

54. O’Neil & Charnes, supra note 50, at 39.
55.

See Healy et al., supra note 5, at 628–31.

56. Marks, supra note 49, at 165.
57.

See, e.g., In re HCA/Columbia Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).

58. Duggin, supra note 1, at 313 (“The selective waiver conf lict pits individuals and entities who have

voluntarily disclosed otherwise privileged materials to law enforcement authorities against third-party
litigants seeking access to these materials in related civil litigation . . . .”).
59.

Id. at 315–16.

60. See In re Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1186–94 (providing an overview of the state of the law

surrounding selective waiver in various circuits, and in the process, clarifying Tenth Circuit law in this
area by rejecting the selective waiver in all contexts). Selective waiver in the context of attorney-client
privilege has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit, but has been rejected by the D.C. Circuit, as well as
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Id. at 1186–88. In the context of attorney work
product, the Fourth Circuit has adopted selective waiver in regards to opinion work product but rejected
it with regard to non-opinion work product, and the First, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have
rejected selected waiver for non-opinion work product. Id. at 1190–91. Further, the state of the law is
unclear in the D.C. Circuit which has upheld, without providing analysis, a district court finding that
the work-product doctrine had not been waived, but has in other circumstances rejected selective waiver
of work-product protection. Id.
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New federal legislation will also provide additional protections to certain quality
assurance material.61 The PSQIA “creates a new and strong federal privilege for
patient safety work product, preempting state laws governing civil or administrative
procedures that would require the disclosure of information by a healthcare provider
to a certified PSO [Patient Safety Organization].”62 The legislation provides an incentive to providers to voluntarily report errors and other incidents by protecting all
disclosures made to PSOs that are certified with, and governed by, the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality.63 The act also sets out that patient safety material
disclosed to a PSO, or in specific other permitted circumstances, continues to be
protected and there is no waiver because of this disclosure to a third party.64 Quality
of care information that is not reported to a PSO is not protected. The preamble to
the proposed regulations, published in February 2008, stresses that “[p]roviders or
PSOs that have a documented patient safety evaluation system will have substantial
proof to support claims of privilege and confidentiality when resisting requests for
production of, or subpoenas for, information constituting patient safety work
product . . . .”65
The legislation seems promising, but the PSQIA will not solve all of a provider’s
reporting disclosure problems while widely differing state policy concurrently exists,66
and it does not protect disclosures made to state regulatory agencies.67 This means
that if a copy of an incident report made for the purpose of reporting to a state
61.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 § 299b-22. The Act reads in pertinent part:
42 USC 299b-22: Privilege and Confidentiality Protections.
(a) Privilege.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, and
subject to subsection (c), patient safety work product shall be privileged and shall not
be—(1) subject to a Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative subpoena or
order, including in a Federal, State, or local civil or administrative disciplinary proceeding
against a provider; (2) subject to discovery in connection with a Federal, State, or local
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding, including in a Federal, State, or local civil or
administrative disciplinary proceeding against a provider; (3) subject to disclosure pursuant
to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of
Information Act) or any other similar Federal, State, or local law; (4) admitted as evidence
in any Federal, State, or local governmental civil proceeding, criminal proceeding,
administrative rulemaking proceeding, or administrative adjudicatory proceeding,
including any such proceeding against a provider . . . .
Id.

62. Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward a Federal Model of Medical Error Reduction, 12

Widener L. Rev. 1, 17 (2005).
63. See id.
64. See Charles M. Key, A Review of the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 18 Health

Law. 20, 21 (2005).
65.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8120.

66. See, e.g., Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the Patient’s Right

to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 25 Trial Advoc. Q. 7, 11 (2006) (noting the unknown impact that
PSQIA’s regulations will have on relevant Florida law).
67.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8123. In addition, the regulations make clear
that regulatory and accrediting agencies may not be certified as PSOs. Id. at 8120, 8126–32.

143

MAKING THE PLAINTIFF’S BAR EARN ITS KEEP

agency is submitted to a PSO, only the copy submitted to the PSO is protected by
the federal privilege and confidentiality provisions.68 The proposed regulations set
out that any entity that provides regulatory overview, such as accreditation or licensure, may not be certified as a PSO because of the need to reassure providers that
patient safety reporting to PSOs will not be punitive.69
Healthcare providers must actually report in order to be protected: “the mere assembling for the purpose of reporting medical errors or other quality information
programs is not enough to trigger protection.”70 Those records compiled for internal
risk management efforts and to report to external regulators will not be considered
patient safety work product, so reports composed for purposes internal to the hospital, as well as mandatory reports made to state agencies, may still be accessible.71
In addition, encouraging providers to report will require convincing them that the
report material will always be protected, which is no easy task when experiences in
certain states, or certain courts, have shown them otherwise.72 For example, Florida’s
recent constitutional amendment opens up all incident reports to the public, not just
those created after the date of the amendment.73
B. Mandatory Incident Reporting in Florida and New York
An incident report is, in broad terms, the product of an internal investigation by
a hospital into an event outside of the hospital’s normal occurrences.74 Incident reporting is defined by the National Patient Safety Foundation as “a process used to
document occurrences that are not consistent with routine hospital operation or
care.”75 The reporting and the investigation may be mandated by a state or federal
regulatory agency.76

68. Id. at 8123.
69. Id. at 8126–27.
70. Ice Miller LLP, Survey of Recent Developments in Health Law, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 1051, 1077 (2006).
71.

See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121.

72. See Key, supra note 64, at 22 (“Only time, and the inevitable challenges, will tell whether the privilege is

as sound as it seems . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kroll, 940 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). But see

Michota v. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 04-1057-CI-19, 2005 WL 900771 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005)
(holding that Amendment 7 is not retroactive).
74.

Dollar, supra note 5, at 263 (citing John F. Monagle, Risk Management: A Guide For Health
Care Professionals 29 (1985)).

75. National Patient Safety Foundation, Patient Safety Definitions, (citing National Patient

Safety Foundation, Lessons in Patient Safety (L.A. Zipperer & S. Cushman eds., 2001)), http://
npsf.org/rc/mp/definitions.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
76. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 329–32.
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An incident report serves two purposes.77 One purpose is to “prepare for potential litigation.”78 The second purpose is to analyze the incident and its circumstances
with the goal of changing or implementing a process to avoid the occurrence of a
similar event in the future.79 After an incident occurs, such as when a patient is
given the wrong medication, a statute usually determines whether it must be reported.80 The investigation into and reporting of the incident generally will be led
by a member of the entity’s risk management or compliance team.81
Examples of incidents that may need to be reported include instances of medical
equipment failure, fire, medication mix-up, surgery on the wrong part of a patient’s
body or surgery on the wrong patient.82 An incident that almost occurs but is averted
is labeled a near miss.83 Near misses are less frequently required to be reported, although some researchers argue that they are just, if not more, important in helping
providers understand a system’s weaknesses.84
Within the healthcare industry, such occurrences are known by different names,
such as incidents, adverse events, or sentinel events. Often, the choice of label used
depends upon the regulatory context, and there are many regulators within the
healthcare industry with individual definitions of incident, resulting in no universal
agreement about what, exactly, an incident entails. For example, the National Patient
Safety Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to improving the safety of
patients, lists definitions currently used by institutions—adverse event is defined nine
ways, accident two ways, and error seven ways.85 The Joint Commission for the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, also known as the Joint Commission or
JCAHO, an independent organization that accredits healthcare organizations, refers
to serious incidents as sentinel events within the context of its reporting

77.

Dollar, supra note 5, at 259.

78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See generally Furrow, supra note 62, at 12; Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 New Eng.

J. Med. 1633 (2002).
81.

This will vary depending upon the organizational structure of the institution.

82. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-l (McKinney 2007).
83. Near misses are often reported along with actual incidents in voluntary reporting systems. Committee

on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building
a Safer Health System 87 (Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter To Err Is Human]
(“When voluntary systems focus on the analysis of ‘near misses’, their aim is to identify and remedy
vulnerabilities in systems before the occurrence of harm.”); see also Ellen Flink et al., Lessons Learned
from the Evolution of Mandatory Adverse Event Reporting Systems, in 3 Advances in Patient Safety:
From Research to Implementation 135, 147 (2005) (“Near misses are a vital part of voluntary
reporting systems.”).
84. Liang, supra note 29, at 357–58.
85. National Patient Safety Foundation, Patient Safety Definitions, http://www.npsf.org/rc/mp/definitions.

php (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
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policy.86 One researcher sums up the vast variety of definitions—and the subtle implications in choice of terms—as follows:
Much lies between the two extremes of blame-free accident and deliberate
harm, and this is reflected by the myriad terms competing to describe the
phenomenon of error in medicine: accidents, mishaps, mistakes, errors, negligence, failures, incompetence, misconduct, malpractice, deficient or
substandard care, adverse or untoward events and the concept of iatrogenic
harm all appear in the literature. In addition, particularly serious incidents
may warrant the label disaster.87

While this wealth of terminology could be viewed as simply a little extra work
for a provider’s quality assurance committee, it is more complicated than that. How
an incident is defined can determine what needs to be reported to regulatory authorities and what is—or should be—protected from discovery in a medical
malpractice claim.88 The proposed PSQIA regulations acknowledge this problem,
which becomes particularly keen when providers from different states—and hence
different regulatory regimes—report to a single PSO. In the draft regulations, therefore, the Department of Health and Human Services actively seeks input in compiling
a standard list of incidents that should be reported.89
In an environment with many regulators, there may be many different entities to
which a hospital must report the occurrence of an incident, as “[s]tate and federal
legislatures, state and federal administrative agencies, industry accrediting, professional and peer review organizations, courts and litigants, and purchaser organizations
are all active regulators of patient safety today.”90 In at least twenty states, including
Florida and New York, state law requires that incidents be reported to the state government.91 Like the variations found in the definitions of the word incident, these
reporting systems are not all the same and do not require that the same events be
86. Joint Comm’n, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, July 2007, available at http://www.

jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/F84F9DC6-A5DA-490F-A91F-A9FCE26347C4/0/SE_chapter_
july07.pdf. JCAHO defines a sentinel event as “an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious
physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or
function. The phrase ‘or the risk thereof ’ includes any process variation for which a recurrence would
carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome.” Id. JCAHO does not consider all medical
errors to rise to the level of a sentinel event. Id.
87.

Oliver Quick, Outing Medical Errors: Questions of Trust and Responsibility, 14 Med. L. Rev. 22, 24
(2006).

88. The difficulty with defining error, and the different definitions according to the regulatory context, can

lead to problems in disclosure because what may be considered a reportable incident by one state or
accreditation organization may not be considered as such by another. For a discussion of the problems
of defining and researching medical error, see Harrington, supra note 8.
89. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8128–29.
90. Mello et al., supra note 1, at 403.
91.

See American Health Lawyers Association, Public Interest Colloquium, Minimizing
Medical Errors: Legal Issues in the Debate on Improving Patient Safety 14 (2003); Leape,
supra note 80.
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reported.92 In addition, some researchers point out that “[t]here is also a lack of uniformity among regulators regarding the degree of protection reports should receive
from legal discovery and public scrutiny, creating uncertainty that especially affects
multistate hospital chains.”93 Therefore, a provider that maintains hospitals in even
two states has a much larger workload with potentially greater levels of uncertainty.
Such differences in confidentiality levels are apparent when comparing incident
data across the nation, and such differences risk hindering the progress in improvement of patient care. This disparity in state practice is evidenced by comparing
Florida and New York, two states in which incident reporting by hospitals is required.
1.

Florida

In Florida, hospitals must report incidents that result in patient injury to the
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.94 Florida law requires hospitals to
report categories of patient injuries in two types of reports.95 One, the Annual
Report, requires a hospital to list all patient injuries that occurred over the course of
a year, the employees or contractors involved in the injuries, and all malpractice
claims against it.96 A second report, the Code Fifteen Report, gives an account to
the Agency for Health Care Administration of injuries that result in patient “death,
brain or spinal damage, surgery unrelated to the patient’s diagnosis, surgery to repair
damage from a planned surgery, surgery to remove foreign objects, wrong site surgery, wrong patient surgery, and wrong surgical procedure.”97 Formerly, there was a
third report, the Twenty-four Hour Report, which reported the above listed injuries
to the agency within one day of the occurrence and serves as a preliminary notification to the state that an incident has occurred.98 Until 2004, these incident reports
were protected from disclosure as identified attorney work product99 and also exempted from public disclosure by statute.100

92.

Although beyond the scope of this note, this patchwork of requirements, aside from creating confusion
and complexity, can lead to additional costs for healthcare systems that maintain hospitals in more than
one state. See Mello et al., supra note 1, at 409.

93.

Id. at 409 (citation omitted).

94. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.0197 (West 2006).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97.

Agency for Health Care Admin., Div. of Managed Care and Health Quality, Mandatory
Serious Patient Injury Reporting: Summary Report Hospitals and Ambulatory Surgical
Centers (1999), available at http://www.fdhc.state.f l.us/mchq/health_facility_regulation/Risk/
documents/1999_A_C_1999%20Annual%20Report%20Summary.pdf.

98. Id.
99. Bay Medical Ctr. v. Sapp, 535 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
100. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.0198 (West 2003) (repealed 2003).
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In 2004, Florida citizens voted to adopt a constitutional amendment that requires Florida hospitals to provide patients, upon their request, with access to any
incident reports created by the hospitals in response to adverse incidents.101 The
amendment does not limit disclosure to incident reports related to the requesting
patient’s injury. Rather, the hospital must provide any incident report to any patient.102 Amendment 7 states, “[i]n addition to any other similar rights provided
herein or by general law, patients have a right to have access to any records made or
received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any
adverse medical incident.”103 “Patient” is defined by the amendment as “an individual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing, or has undergone care or treatment
in a health care facility or by a health care provider.”104 The amendment does not
specify that the patient must seek only those records relating to that patient’s treatment, although it does require hospitals to redact patient identifying information
when disclosing incident reports to others.105
Enabling legislation, passed one year after the amendment was ratified, attempted to limit the reach of the amendment by stating that incident reports created
prior to the passage of the amendment were not available for disclosure because they
were created under confidential circumstances.106 The legislation also attempted to
define “patient” more narrowly with regard to patient access to incident records.107
Florida courts have held the enabling legislation unconstitutional.108 Currently, any
incident report created after the passage of the constitutional amendment is open to
access by the patient involved, or by patients who may have experienced a similar
incident, and it is likely that any incident report created before the amendment will
also be accessible to those patients, and in reality, to the general public.109
Hospitals in Florida therefore have little state protection for their incident reports. In Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen, each of the plaintiffs in three
101. Fla. Const. art. X, § 25.
102. See, e.g., Morton Plant Hosp. Ass’n v. Shahbas ex. rel. Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820, 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2007) (“[T]he Shahbases, as previous patients, are entitled to any of the hospital’s records relating to any
adverse medical incident. There is no requirement that the records discoverable under Amendment 7 be
relevant to any pending litigation.”).
103. Fla. Const. art. X, § 25(a).
104. Id. at (c)(2).
105. Id. at § 25; James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know Come at

Too High a Price?, 24 Trial Advoc. Q. 7, 11 (2005).
106. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.028 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008).
107. Id. at (7)(a) (“Pursuant to s. 25, Art. X of the State Constitution, the adverse medical incident records to

which a patient is granted access are those of the facility or provider of which he or she is a patient and
which pertain to any adverse medical incident affecting the patient or any other patient which involves
the same or substantially similar condition, treatment, or diagnosis as that of the patient requesting access.”
(emphasis added)).
108. See Notami Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
109. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 105, at 11.
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medical malpractice cases consolidated for trial requested that the hospital produce
peer review, risk management, and credentialing documents.110 When the trial court
ordered the hospital to produce the documents, the hospital petitioned for a writ of
certiorari.111 The appellate court denied the writ, stating that “the Hospital does not
have a vested right in maintaining the confidentiality of adverse medical incidents
[because t]he Hospital’s ‘right’ is no more than an expectation that previously existing statutory law would not change.”112 The appellate court held that the enabling
legislation, section 381.028 of the Florida Statutes, “impermissibly restricts rights
expressly granted under the Constitution.”113
More research must be done to know whether Florida’s mandatory incident reporting, coupled with the newfound public access to those reports, has had any effect
on the level of reporting actually done by hospitals. In Florida’s Agency for Health
Care Administration’s March 2007 Risk Management and Patient Safety Newsletter,
the agency reported that 710 incidents were reported from 282 licensed hospitals.114
One hundred and two of those did not file any incident reports in two of the last
three years.115 It seems unlikely that those 102 hospitals did not have any reportable
incidents during that time period. In any event, as compared to other states with
published data, like New York, this level of mandatory reporting is very low.116
The PSQIA provides a privilege and confidentiality provision that protects patient safety work product from discovery.117 While the federal legislation is clear
that it preempts state law, it is also clear that it only protects specific data, not any
state-mandated reporting, and so will not provide any additional protection for the
two aforementioned reports that hospitals must file with Florida’s Department of
Health.118
2.

New York

New York presents a very different side of the debate. State law mandates that
hospitals report any incidents that, among other things, did or could have harmed or
110. 927 So. 2d 139, 141–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), aff ’d in part per curiam, Florida Hosp. Waterman,

Inc., v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing, retroactive,
and applies to records that existed before its passage; those sections of 381.028 that conflict with the
amendment are unconstitutional and severed from the statute).
111. Id. at 141.
112. Id. at 143–44.
113. Id. at 143.
114. See Risk Mgmt. and Patient Safety Newsl. (Agency for Healthcare Administration, Tallahassee,

FL), March 2007, at 1, available at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/MCHQ/Health_Facility_Regulation/
Risk/documents/march_2007_RM_newsletter.pdf.
115. Id.
116. See Flink et al., supra note 83.
117. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22; see also Patient Safety and

Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8140–56.
118. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121.
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killed a patient. Specifically, Public Health Law section 2805-l says, “All hospitals .
. . shall be required to report incidents . . . to the [Department of Health] in a
manner and within time periods as may be specified by regulation of the
department.”119 The statute lists the types of incidents required to be reported, including patient death or bodily function impairment not related to the patient’s
illness, hospital fires, equipment malfunctions, poisonings, strikes, disasters not
originating within the hospital, and the termination of hospital services such as heat,
laundry, food, or rodent control.120 Incident reporting is mandatory in New York:
hospitals that do not report adverse events to the New York Patient Occurrence
Reporting and Tracking System (“NYPORTS”) may be publicly sanctioned.121
After less than successful attempts with other reporting methods, including a
paper-based method, New York created a secure electronic reporting system,
NYPORTS, to simplify the reporting process.122 Two other New York statutes,
Public Health Law section 2805-m and Education Law section 6527, provide for the
confidentiality of the reports entered into the NYPORTS system. Public Health
Law section 2805-m states that “reports required to be submitted pursuant to [statutory requirements] shall be kept confidential and shall not be released except to the
department.”123 It also provides an additional layer of protection by specifying that
the reports may not be accessed from the Department of Health through use of the
New York freedom of information law.124 In addition, Education Law section 6527
states that “records relating to performance of a medical or a quality assurance review
function” are generally exempt from disclosure.125
For the most part, the statutory confidentiality provisions that protect these
mandatory reports work to both encourage providers to comply with the reporting
requirements and to protect providers in litigation.126 For example, the First
119. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-l(1) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2008).
120. Id. at § 2805-l(2).
121. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, Office of Health Systems Mgmt., N.Y.

Patient Occurrence
Reporting and Tracking System Report 3–6 (2000–2001). Compliance with the reporting
requirements is monitored through “overall hospital surveillance activities” which include chart reviews
by an outside independent agency. Id.

122. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 137–38.
123. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-m(1) (McKinney 2007).
124. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-m.
125. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3); see, e.g., Orner v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 761 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606–07 (1st Dep’t

2003).
126. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Central General Hosp., Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep’t 1998). A comparison

between the number of reports submitted to the NYPORTS mandatory reporting system and those
submitted to the JCAHO voluntary reporting system reveals that considerably more incidents are
reported when the reporting is mandatory. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 142. Flink determined that
between January 1995 and December 2003, 2,405 events were reported to JCAHO (176 of these were
from New York hospitals) while during 1998 and December 2003 the NYPORTS system received
11,028 reports. Id. JCAHO has published Sentinel Event Statistics as of December 31, 2007 on its
website. The total number of sentinel events reviewed by JCAHO between January 1995 and December
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Department has emphasized that, although the confidentiality provisions may make
things harder for a particular plaintiff, the plaintiff ’s hardship is outweighed by the
benefit the public receives “by encouraging open and candid discussion.”127 Despite
this, there are still some cases in which a hospital’s incident report is ordered released
to the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action. In most of these cases, disclosure is
ordered because the report was found to have been prepared in the ordinary course of
business,128 because it was not prepared pursuant to the quality assurance privilege,129
or because the privilege was waived by the involvement of a third party.130
Confidentiality may be defeated if a hospital cannot prove that it prepared its
incident reports in accordance with statute. For example, in Marte v. Brooklyn
Hospital Center, the hospital did not establish that the documents were prepared pursuant to Public Health Law section 2805-l or Education Law section 6527(3).131
Specifically, the court said that, “[a] review of the . . . [h]ospital’s motion for a protective order and the attached documents does not reveal any statement by the
Hospital that it actually prepared any committee review incident reports for the
Department of Health as required under Public Health Law § 2805-l.”132 The court
also said that “[r]ecords generated at the behest of a quality assurance committee for
31, 2007 is listed as 4,817. See The Joint Commission, Sentinel Event Statistics: As of December 31,
2 0 07, ht t p: //w w w.joi ntcom m is sion .or g / N R /rdon ly re s / D7836542-A 372- 4F 93-8BD7DDD11D43E484/0/se_stats_063007.pdf. It is important to keep in mind that, although New York
and JCAHO vary in their reporting requirements and so do not require hospitals to always report the
same incidents, JCAHO is a national accreditation agency, drawing reports from hospitals in every
state, while the NYPORTS statistics derive only from hospitals in New York. One researcher,
comparing data from different state agencies, including New York, Utah, Florida, and Colorado, to data
from JCAHO in an earlier time period, noted that part of the discrepancy between numbers is in part
due to the difference in definition of error and adverse event. Harrington, supra note 8, at 362–66.
127. Brathwaite v. State, 623 N.Y.S.2d 228, 235 (1st Dep’t 1995). See also Finnegan v. State, 686 N.Y.S.2d

589, 591–94 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1999) (comprehensive review of the differences in the appellate departments
over the scope of the privilege).
128. Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03–6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at *1–2

(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006) (“Here, the reports in question are not assessing the care
provided . . . . It further appears that the reports were made in the regular course of business pursuant
to 10 NYCRR § 405.8(b)(1).”).
129. See, e.g., Feig v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 636 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995) appeal dismissed, 653

N.Y.S.2d 782 (1st Dep’t 1997) (holding that under the education law, hospital could not keep confidential
documents prepared by a private agency the hospital had hired to investigate an incident); Berggren v.
Saint Vincent’s Catholic Med. Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., No. 10129/04, 2004 WL 2903641, at *1 (Sup. Ct.
Richmond County Dec. 13, 2004) (holding that an incident report about chair that collapsed under
patient while he sat in the waiting room not privileged). But see People v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps.
Corp. (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 709 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (1st Dep’t 2000) (upholding
that since defendant was not a hospital as defined under Public Health Law § 2808(1) its peer review
and quality assurance records could not be privileged; yet the court also upheld that documents prepared
by an “independent professional standards review firm” were privileged under Education Law §
6527(3)).
130. See, e.g., Feig, 636 N.Y.S.2d 971. But see N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp, 709 N.Y.S.2d 513.
131. 779 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (2d Dep’t 2004).
132. Id. at 87 (citing Matter of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Doe, 99 N.Y.2d 434 (2003)).
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quality assurance purposes, including compilations, studies or comparisons derived
from multiple records, should be privileged, whereas records simply duplicated by the
committee are not necessarily privileged.”133 This analysis is not clear, as the court
does not explain in further detail how it determined that the reports were not prepared for the Department of Health as required by statute.
In Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical Center, the Supreme Court
of Suffolk County found that incident reports that are “multi-motivated,” meaning
those that report errors pursuant to statute as well as in the regular course of business, and that do not contain any review of quality of care, are not covered under the
privilege.134 Part of the purpose of incident reporting is to assess quality of care. If
a hospital does not assess its care but simply reports an incident because it is supposed to, it does not get the benefit of the privilege. It can also be argued that if
there is no quality assurance review analysis within the incident report, there is
nothing in the report that needs to be kept confidential anyway, as the facts underlying the incident are discoverable and any error impacting the patient should have
been recorded in the patient’s medical record.
In addition, New York courts are clear that a document does not fall under the
privilege simply because it was used or reviewed by a quality assurance committee.
For example, in Spradley v. Pergament Home Centers, the Second Department noted
that “merely because documents are placed in a quality assurance file does not ‘per se
render these documents privileged from disclosure under the Education Law §
6527(3).’”135 Hospitals cannot hide incriminating records by claiming a blanket
quality assurance privilege. Providers would be well advised to clearly label any incident reports to ensure that there is no mistaking reports for other documents that
happen to be in a quality assurance committee’s file.
III. THE RISKS OF NON-CONFIDENTIALITY

A number of factors have chiseled away at the confidentiality that should be
given to incident reports. These factors include the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report on the prevalence of medical error in the American healthcare system,136 the
plaintiffs’ bar,137 and public outcry demanding accountability and improved error
reporting systems in the healthcare industry.138 One researcher notes that shortly
after the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) released its 1999 report on medical errors,
To Err Is Human, a national magazine published an article with a sensationalist
133. Id. at 88.
134. No. 03-6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006); see also Crawford v.

Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189 (2d Dep’t 1998); Sonsini v. Memorial Hosp. for Cancer and Diseases, 693
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep’t 1999) (upholding that maintenance log for mammography machine not considered
quality assurance material).
135. 689 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep’t 1999) (quoting Heitman v. Mango, 654 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep’t 1997)).
136. To Err Is Human, supra note 83.
137. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1063–65; Liang, supra note 29, at 348–50.
138. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 342.
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headline drawing attention to doctors and their “deadly mistakes.”139 The researcher
also noted that following the article, plaintiffs’ attorneys often (incorrectly) referred
to the IOM’s statistics as evidence that doctors are committing malpractice at breakneck speed, so they should be sued more often, not less.140
The IOM’s 1999 report recommended that the United States implement a national, mandatory reporting system.141 Proponents of mandatory incident reporting
explain that analyzing the incidents increases patient safety by requiring hospitals to
analyze the root of the problem and implement processes to prevent the problem
from happening again.142 By making incident reporting mandatory, providers are
forced to evaluate the failings in their systems. Not all reporting systems are mandatory, and voluntary reporting systems, like that of JCAHO, tend to have lower
numbers of providers reporting. 143 A hospital does not have to report to JCAHO
because a hospital does not have to be accredited by JCAHO to treat patients, although most hospitals prefer to take on the extra responsibility to appear more
reliable and trustworthy.144 But because both the accreditation and the reporting are
voluntary, there is less at stake for a hospital that is non-compliant with JCAHO.
However, even in mandatory reporting systems, reporting levels may be low because
providers may decide to risk sanctions instead of disclosure. This may have contributed to the low numbers that Florida reports.145
Many proponents also think that the reports should be shared with other hospitals and healthcare institutions, because while “[t]he primary purpose of reporting is
to learn from experience,” sharing the reports with other institutions enables those
institutions to also learn from another’s experience and implement their own preventative measures.146 By seeing where others have gone wrong, hospitals have the
opportunity to correct the same or similar problems in their systems and processes

139. Harrington, supra note 8, at 343–44 (citing Michael D. Lemonick, Doctors’ Deadly Mistakes, TIME,

Dec. 13, 1999, at 74).
140. Id.
141. To Err Is Human, supra note 83, at 9. In 1999, the IOM published its ground-breaking report, To Err

Is Human, in which its authors noted that at least 44,000 and possibly as many as 98,000 Americans die
each year because of medical errors. Id. at 26. The IOM, a non-governmental organization associated
with the National Academy of Sciences, provides advice to the federal government on such issues as
health and medical issues, among others. See Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, http://
www.iom.edu (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
142. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 144.
143. Furrow, supra note 62, at 14 (“The third problem [of three problems with the JCAHO disclosure

standard] is, lacking real regulatory muscle, the level of actual disclosure of errors has been very low.”).
144. See Joint Comm’n, Accreditation Programs—Hospitals, http://www.joint-commission.org (last visited

Sept. 18, 2008) (“The Joint Commission has been accrediting hospitals for more than 50 years. Its
accreditation is a nationwide seal of approval that indicates a hospital meets high performance
standards.”).
145. See Risk Mgmt. and Patient Safety Newsl., supra note 114, at 1.
146. Leape, supra note 80.
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before the same mistakes happen in their institutions.147 The PSQIA takes a new
step toward a national reporting system and in ensuring confidentiality to those
analyses of incidents reported into its system. But the PSQIA does not protect incident reports made for other purposes.148 Ultimately, the problem is that neither
mandatory nor voluntary reporting can or will work effectively until full privilege is
restored to incident reports.
While some physicians and professional medical associations oppose mandatory
reporting,149 the public thinks mandatory reporting improves accountability.150 But
beyond simply wanting incidents to be reported, the public wants access to those reports: “62 to 73 percent of Americans believe that healthcare providers should be
required to make this information [uncovered during investigations] publicly
available.”151 The fact that a high percentage of the public may want these reports
can play directly into the fears of providers, which can lead to less thorough reporting, and ultimately defeats the goals of the reporting—accountability and quality
improvement.152
Several arguments urge the disclosure of incident reports, the first being the interest of the injured plaintiff. In the course of litigating a malpractice case, a patient
will use, among other things, his medical chart to prove that a provider did not perform to a reasonable standard of care.153 But if the medical chart does not contain
the information the patient seeks, such as notations regarding an error or an indication of a deviation from the standard of care, and given evidence that doctors
147. See Office of Health Systems Mgmt., N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, N.Y. Patient Occurrence

Reporting and Tracking System Report 2000/2001 6 (July 2003), http://www.health.state.ny.us/
nysdoh/hospital/nyports/annual_report/2000-2001/pdf/2000-2001_annual_report.pdf (explaining the
database of reported adverse events in NY: “While the identity of individual hospitals in the comparative
groups is not disclosed, the comparative database is a useful tool in support of hospital quality
improvement activities”).
148. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121 (“[I]nformation that is collected to

comply with external obligations is not patient safety work product. Such activities may include: State
incident reporting requirements . . . .”).
149. See Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors—Could It Do Harm?, 342

New Eng. J. Med. 1123 (2000); Michelle Harper & Robert L. Helmreich, Identifying Barriers to the
Success of a Reporting System, in 3 Advances in Patient Safety: From Research to Implementation
167, 172 (2005).
150. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 148.
151. Leape, supra note 80 (citing The Kaiser Family Found., National Survey on Americans as

Health Care Consumers (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Washington, D.C.,
December 2000)).
152. Although not directly on point in this note, it should be noted that there is a prevalence of “shame and

blame” within the medical industry that points fingers at individuals; this environment has further
perpetuated providers’ fears of being singled out. However, the IOM report and a number of scholars
have concluded that error in the medical industry is more often the result of a system’s failure than
attributable to individuals. See, e.g., Liang & Small, supra note 29, at 222–26.
153. See, e.g., Talavera ex rel. Rios v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. Corp., 851 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (1st Dep’t

2008) (“Plaintiffs submitted affirmations from a physician establishing that the medical records, on
their face, evince that defendant failed to provide proper care to plaintiffs . . . .”).
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sometimes do not fully complete their patients’ medical records, it is not unreasonable for the patient to wonder whether the provider has neglected to include the
relevant information in his chart.154 The patient may then seek other documents
from the hospital in order to make his or her case, arguing a substantial need for the
information and undue hardship without it. An incident report would be ideal for
this purpose, as it may contain a description of the event, the actor(s) involved, and
an analysis of what happened.155 It is possible that such an analysis may contain
references or comparisons to earlier, similar incidents as well.
A second argument for disclosure of incident reports is that the public has a right
to know which hospitals are safe and what its hospitals are doing wrong.156 Patients
are consumers, and to be reasonably informed consumers, they should have all of the
facts about the hospitals with which they entrust their safety and well-being.157 A
patient cannot make an informed decision without having all of the facts at hand.158
Public access to incident report information, such as that in Florida, gives the public
greater control over its quality of care and allows the public to make independent,
more educated decisions when selecting among healthcare providers.
It is therefore not surprising that providers think that if they participate in or
share information recorded in incident reports, they risk: 1) being sued;159 2) irreparable damage to their professional reputations;160 and 3) professional sanctions.161
Providers also worry that error or incident information shared within a confidential
environment—i.e., with another institution for collaborative or educational purposes—will waive any applicable privileges and be discoverable.162 Sometimes, these
worries mean that they do not share error information within their own institution.163 It may seem safer to the providers not to say anything at all.
The fear of litigation from incident report disclosure has been described as overblown, with some researchers arguing that there has not been a demonstrated link
154. See Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DePaul

L. Rev. 357, 362 (2005).
155. Dollar, supra note 5, at 266–67.
156. See Laura A. Chernitsky, Note, Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Modifying the HCQIA to Allow the

Dissemination of Physician Information to Healthcare Consumers, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737, 755–56
(2006).
157. Other researchers have found, however, that patients either do not use quality comparisons or find the

information on provider quality of care information not useful. Mello et al., supra note 1, at 392–93
(citing the six different studies).
158. On the other side of this argument, this information is already out there, although it is scattered and

would undoubtedly be time-consuming for consumers to find and understand. Chernitsky, supra note
156, at 742–44.
159. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 149.
160. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.
161. Id.
162. See discussion supra Part II.A.
163. See Andrews, supra note 154.
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between reporting and litigation.164 However, one researcher writes that a plaintiff ’s
law firm received over $100 million in contingency fees over the course of five years
by using quality of care information gleaned from nursing homes.165 Another researcher points out that immediately after Florida’s constitutional amendment took
effect, “several plaintiffs’ lawyers sent hospitals requests for the disclosure of documents that were created in confidence . . . . Plaintiffs’ attorneys were using the
passage of Amendment 7 as a cast-net to fish for cases.”166
Even just the worry of litigation is enough to keep providers from engaging fully
in the incident reporting process.167 One researcher hypothesizes that “this trend by
the courts to compel discovery of hospital incident reports will discourage health
care providers from making immediate, full disclosure; rather, health care providers
will likely report only minimal factual descriptions of accidents already contained in
the patient’s chart.”168 A national study of risk managers in 2002, performed in response to JCAHO’s implementation of a sentinel event policy, revealed that
“[r]eluctance to disclose preventable harms was twice as likely to occur at hospitals
having major concerns about the malpractice implications of disclosure.”169 The
study examined why there was little reporting and found the reasons to be “failure to
recognize that an error occurred, liability worries, concerns about job security . . .
and concerns about personal and professional reputation.”170 Other studies of error
reporting show that many errors and near misses are never actually reported.171
Providers may choose not to disclose a near miss or minor incident to an affected
patient, preferring to avoid any chance of litigation and damage to reputation under
the rationale that the patient was not harmed, and does not need to know.172 Some
164. Leape, supra note 80; see also Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National

Survey, 22 Health Affairs 73, 80 (2003) (“A different, and increasingly prominent, twist on the
malpractice issue is that clinicians’ and hospital’s perceptions about litigation risk may be worse than the
reality.”).
165. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 618.
166. Hawkins, supra note 66, at 7–8.
167. In her note, Dollar cites to an older study of Ohio hospitals in which the hospital staff had compiled

incident reports for only half of the incidents that resulted in legal action against the hospital. Dollar,
supra note 5, at 286 (citing Gladys Duran, Positive Use of Incident Reports, 53 Hosps. 60, 60 (1979)).
Additional research should be done in this area to determine whether there has been any improvement
in incident report completion.
168. Dollar, supra note 5, at 260.
169. Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 73. The study found that “fear of medical malpractice litigation was still

the most commonly cited institutional barrier to developing and implementing disclosure policies,
followed by staff opposition.” Id. at 76.
170. Furrow, supra note 62, at 29.
171. Id. (noting “[o]ne study found that twenty-nine percent of observed errors were not reported”).
172. See Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1072 (citing Thomas H. Gallager et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How

Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 Archives Internal Med. 1585, 1585
(2006)). But see Am. Medical Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions With
Annotations, –, 242 (2006) (“An expression of concern need not be an admission of
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other researchers have found that providers are more inclined to tell patients about
the little things.173 This lack of reporting may not be improved despite the protections that will arise with the implementation of the PSQIA, particularly in states
that have mandatory reporting requirements. This is because providers, concerned
with confidentiality and afraid of the implications of full disclosure, may continue to
divulge only the barest facts or will not report at all, lending little value in the new
federal reporting system. A reporting system can only be effective if its providers
feel protected.
Studies have found that providers would be more motivated to report if the reports were protected from discovery.174 Protecting the confidentiality of the reporting
system is one of five critical elements identified by researchers at the New York
Department of Health for a successful mandatory reporting system.175 While many
experts in the field disagree on how to improve the quality of care patients receive in
hospitals, “quality experts almost universally agree that an important predicate to
quality improvement is for providers themselves to identify medical errors and other
quality problems through data analysis and the generation of self-critical quality of
care information.”176 Confidentiality must be a part of the providers’ internal review
process. It is safe to surmise that without this protection, whether or not there is a
legitimate basis for providers’ fears, reports will lack any useful mental impressions or
thorough analysis, containing only the same bare facts that can be found in the medical record. Absent as well will be the opportunity to learn any lasting, meaningful
lesson about the error—why it happened, and how another can be prevented, perhaps
at a different hospital across the country.
The problem of the unprotected incident report looms particularly large in states
where providers must report, and especially for healthcare systems that provide care
in more than one state.177 Hospitals are often already required by the state in which
they are licensed to report adverse events. And to be accredited by independent organizations, such as JCAHO, they must also analyze and report incidents.178 In
responsibility. When patient harm has been caused by an error, physicians should offer a general
explanation . . . . Such communication is fundamental to the trust that underlies the patient-physician
relationship, and may help reduce the risk of liability.”).
173. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 154, at 361.
174. Harper & Helmreich, supra note 149, at 177.
175. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 149. The four other elements are: 1) collaborative system development

with the stakeholders; 2) clear reporting criteria; 3) continual training; and 4) creating a stakeholder
advisory group. Id.
176. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 596.
177. Some physician researchers argue for fewer regulators as one solution. “Pluralistic regulation is a choice,

not an inevitability. In other industries in which safety is a concern, we have limited the number of
regulators.” Mello et al., supra note 1, at 403. While not the central focus of this note, it would likely
be easier to mandate the confidentiality of incident reports if the number of regulators was limited.
Other researchers advocate for a national agency to collect all of the error information. See Liang, supra
note 29, at 357.
178. See, e.g., JCAHO, supra note 86.
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addition, hospital risk management departments and quality assurance committees
review and analyze incidents in an attempt to improve hospital processes and prevent
errors from happening in the future.179 Thorough, thoughtful, and self-critical incident reporting is essential for the hospital and, in particular, for its patients.180
Hospitals may feel they are risking a great deal by opening up their analysis to regulators, and perhaps even their own internal quality improvement staff, for fear that
the public, knowing those reports are there, will seek the information.181 These
fears, and continued encroachment on confidentiality such as Florida’s constitutional
amendment, will lead to bare-bones reporting without thorough analysis.
Incident reports, particularly those analyzing systems’ breakdowns and root
causes of incidents, may also make life much easier for a plaintiff ’s attorney.182 The
reports explain what went wrong, why, list the hospital employees involved, and may
discuss or compare the reported incident with previous ones. If a plaintiff ’s attorney
can access the incident report, much of that attorney’s work is already done.183
Incident reports provide a vehicle for the hospitals to improve their quality of care, to
learn from others’ mistakes, and for the states to assist in improving rates of errors.
They are not meant to give a plaintiff a leg up in settlement negotiations, or at trial,
but a lack of confidentiality leads them to be used for this purpose.184
In states where providers are required to report incidents, loss of privilege, or
lack of privilege to begin with, is especially a problem.185 In these states, because of
the mandate to file incident reports after certain events, courts may view the reports
179. See Dollar, supra note 5; Healy et al., supra note 5.
180. See Dollar, supra note 5, at 264 (explaining why incident reporting is important); Duggin, supra note 1,

at 346 (expressing the concern that with loss of attorney-client privilege, less will be committed to
writing, with adverse consequences).
181. Duggin, supra note 1, at 341 (“[F]ear that materials generated in the course of quality reviews will end

up in the hands of prosecutors or civil plaintiffs undoubtedly diminishes the enthusiasm for the review
process.”).
182. See Dollar, supra note 5, at 291–92.
183. See, e.g., Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (Wells, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent notes that it is fundamentally unfair to allow
into evidence records of hospital investigations that were previously protected by statute. Id. at 495.
However, the majority opinion found that to disallow access to records of adverse incidents created
before the passage of the amendment would defeat the purpose of the amendment and “a patient would
never actually gain the access plainly promised by the amendment.” Id. at 489–90. “Clearly, one of the
primary purposes of the amendment is to provide a patient contemplating treatment by a medical
provider access to that provider’s past history of adverse incidents.” Id. at 490 n.6.
184. There has been some consideration as to whether the tort system provides a method of improving

patient safety at hospitals. However, some researchers find that relying on the tort system to improve
safety is ill-advised:
[The tort system’s] ability to set new standards for patient safety is circumscribed by the
continued reliance of most states’ courts on medical custom to set the standard of care . . .
[a]t best, it is a regulator of last resort, seeking to make whole those who have suffered
injuries that other forms of regulation have tried and failed to prevent.
Mello et al., supra note 1, at 418.
185. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.A.
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as part of the business operations of a hospital and not subject to a particular privilege.186 Arguably, incident reports are not created in the ordinary course of business,
as healthcare providers are not generally in the business of injuring people.187 Yet,
this argument does not always hold up at trial.188
Overall, the continued lack of protection for incident reports detracts from the
quality of our health care, perpetuates the shame-and-blame culture of medical error,
and can unfairly prejudice the defendant provider in litigation. In addition, such
potential disclosure of incident reports ultimately endangers everyone who uses the
healthcare system.
IV. RETHINKING THE INCIDENT REPORT

There is a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of incident reports that
has pervaded our medical and legal systems. Incident reports do not provide anything new to an investigation except opportunity for the plaintiff. They are, and
should remain, a tool for the hospitals to improve the quality of their care. Making
hospital incident reports discoverable only impedes the quality assurance function
they are meant to serve. Error reporting and quality improvement have reached a
stalemate. Incident reports must be taken out of the equation completely in order to
propel the healthcare industry beyond its current stagnant relationship with medical
error. While the PSQIA is a start, federal legislation must go further in providing a
broad protection to all incident reports, including those required to be reported to
state regulators, and preempt state law that says otherwise.
One study identifies three primary reasons why quality of care information
should be kept confidential: 1) providers who review their quality of care usually
provide better care; 2) lack of confidentiality is a disincentive to providers to review
their care; and 3) healthcare providers are already subject to sanctions by state and
federal governments when their care is substandard.189 The key to understanding
why incident reports should be kept confidential in litigation, whether or not they
are disclosed within a particular community for the purpose of quality improvement,
lies in remembering that the underlying facts of the adverse event are discoverable, as
is the affected patient’s medical record.190 It is the responsibility of the physicians
186. See, e.g., Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03–6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at

*1 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006).
187. While it can be argued that it should be regular procedure for a hospital to analyze its procedures after

an incident, this regular procedure should not be considered within the hospital’s ordinary course of
business because its business is providing health care; incidents are often unique and unpredictable.
188. See, e.g., Williams, 2006 WL 2559527, at *2 (“It further appears that the reports were made in the

regular course of business pursuant to 10 NYCRR § 405.8(b)(1).”).
189. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 600–01.
190. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Thus, it is the patient’s medical record and not the incident report that

should be deemed part of the health provider’s regular course of business, though both may be kept as
such. And in fact, much information about a provider’s quality of care is already required to be made
available to the public, including the results of a state agency’s review of a facility and information on
providers who have violated the law. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 614–15.
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and other caregivers to note any mistakes along with everything else in the patient’s
record,191 and “most states have statutory penalties for inaccurate, incomplete, or
falsified hospital records.”192 The proposed regulations for the PSQIA underscore
this by specifically defining a patient’s medical record and other information that
goes into the record as not patient safety work product.193
An incident report is not a set of new facts, or a repository for those facts a guiltridden doctor would like to keep hidden from the patient. On the contrary, an
incident report is a hospital’s analysis of a problem and a compilation of the findings
of the hospital’s investigation into the matter, described so that the hospital can learn
from its mistakes.194 If done well, an incident report is a candid, thorough examination of what went wrong.195 The incident report is the hospital’s research into its
processes and is for the benefit of the hospital—and all of the hospital’s patients. But
because of this candid research into previous occurrences, staff behavior, and equipment performance, incident reports can be a gold mine for a patient’s attorney.196
The hospital can be penalized for attempting to prevent future harm. By allowing
discovery of incident reports—documents meant for self-evaluation and fulfillment
of regulatory requirements—the quality of our health care is endangered.197
While the patient’s attorney absolutely should not be barred from discovering
the facts, the patient’s attorney should be denied access to what essentially amount to
arguments made for it by the defendant.198 The hospital should not be required to
present the patient with his or her case. Likewise, incident reports should not be
191. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1070–72.
192. Dollar, supra note 5, at 262–63. See also N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(32) (McKinney 2002), which deems

“[f]ailing to maintain a record for each patient which accurately reflects the evaluation and treatment of
the patient” professional misconduct. A physician found guilty of misconduct can be subjected to any
number of penalties, including up to a $10,000 fine for each instance of misconduct and revocation of
the provider’s license.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230-a (McKinney 2001 & Supp 2008); see, e.g.,
Saunders v. Admin. Review Bd. for Prof ’l Med. Conduct, 695 N.Y.S.2d 778 (3d Dep’t 1999) (upholding
suspension of a doctor’s medical license for inadequate medical records, deceptive advertising, and
ordering unnecessary medical tests). In Florida, failing to keep legible medical records that justify the
course of treatment is grounds for disciplinary action. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.331(1)(m) (West 2007).
It should be noted that complete medical records are also important for hospitals that participate in the
Medicare program. See, e.g., Jeff Sinaiko et al., Emerging Issues in Physician Documentation and
Compliance: All of the Old, More of the New, 9 J. Health Care Compliance 5 (2007).
193. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8173.
194. See, e.g., JCAHO, supra note 86 (describing root cause analysis requirements for analyzing sentinel

events).
195. See id.
196. See Healy et al., supra note 5, at 618–19.
197. Dollar, supra note 5, at 267.
198. See Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, supra note 14, at 5 (“[I]ndividuals should have

access to information leading up to and including the occurrence of a preventable error that caused their
serious injury or the death of a family member. However . . . subsequent ‘root-cause’ analyses undertaken
to determine the internal shortcomings of the hospital’s delivery system should not be subject to
discovery in litigation . . . .”).
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discoverable in litigation because the relevant information they provide should be
duplicative of what is already recorded in the patient’s chart. Further, any changes to
processes or systems recommended in the report cannot be introduced as evidence of
wrongdoing because such recommendations may be considered remedial action, and
as such cannot be introduced to show liability.199
As discussed above, hospital incident reports are the hospital’s analysis of a
problem. Using the facts of the incident, the hospital is able to analyze what went
wrong in the hopes of improving its quality of care. These facts are also available to
the plaintiff because they are found in the patient’s medical chart and record.200
There is no need to give the plaintiff ’s attorney access to a document that reiterates
facts already available and that may lay out the plaintiff ’s case, to the detriment of
the defense and the general public.
Yet patients and their attorneys should be reassured that hospitals cannot use the
incident report as a hiding place for facts that a hospital does not wish plaintiffs to
learn.201 And in fact, model legislation proposed by researchers thirteen years ago
emphasizes that hospitals should not include facts in the incident report that cannot
be found in the medical and other records of the hospital accessible by the plaintiff.202 This is echoed in the PSQIA. In the proposed regulations, the following is
excluded from the definition of patient safety work product: “a patient’s original
medical record, billing and discharge information, or any or any other original information that is collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately
from, a patient safety evaluation system.”203
Providers also face serious sanctions for not completing patients’ charts on a
timely basis.204 To more effectively counter bad physician behavior and to give
injured patients what they need to be made whole, attention should focus not on accessing incident reports, but on sanctioning providers who do not complete their
patients’ charts accurately and on a timely basis. To aid chart completion, other provider staff who notice the incomplete chart should be encouraged to report
noncompliance, perhaps with education about labor laws prohibiting retaliation and
access to an anonymous hotline.205 There can be no excuse for not completing a
199. Fed. R. Evid. 407; see also Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 7–8 (describing states’ evidence rules on

remedial action).
200. See Dollar, supra note 5.
201. See id. at 262–63 (citing William H. Roach, Jr. et al., Medical Records and the Law 15,

Appendix B (1985); Janine Fiesta, The Law and Liability: A Guide For Nurses 173–93 (2 ed.
1988)).
202. See generally Dollar, supra note 5; Healy et al., supra note 5.
203. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8120.
204. See, e.g., Gray v. Jaeger, 794 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep’t 2005) (upholding an order to strike defendant

physician’s answer, as his failure to keep medical records was negligent and precluded plaintiff from
presenting prima facie case); Ruggiero v. State Dep’t of Health, 643 N.Y.S.2d 698 (3d Dep’t 1996)
(upholding the revocation of license for physician who kept a filthy office, mixed food and medication
in refrigerator, and relied on memory, not paper records, when treating patients).
205. See, e.g., N.Y. Lab. Law § 741 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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patient’s chart accurately and expeditiously. Providers cannot hide the facts of a
course of treatment, even if they might like to. And while it may be true in some
cases that a patient may bear an undue burden in proving his or her case without
benefit of the incident report, in those cases, the court must review the incident report in-camera to determine what, if anything, should be released to the plaintiff.
Recognizing that incident reports may only be discoverable when medical charts are
not accurately completed may provide additional incentive to providers to ensure
charts are complete.
In addition, although some defense attorneys may disagree, providers must be
forthright with their patients. It may be, but is not always true, that a patient does
not need access to the incident report to know something went wrong with his or her
procedure.206 The Joint Commission and many institutions already require that mistakes be disclosed to patients even if the patient would have been unaware.207 Where
state law does not mandate disclosure, a physician’s code of ethics does: “Hospitals,
physicians, or nurses have no moral or legal rights to withhold information from patients. Full disclosure is not an option; it is an ethical imperative.”208 Some hospitals
have instituted full disclosure and apology policies, gambling on the theory that affected patients will be less likely to sue if they are dealt with honestly and sincerely.209
It is worth noting that defense attorneys generally greet such policies with skepticism.210 The patient must be told of the error, and will have the ability to access the
medical chart if he or she decides to take further action. Informing the patient of an
error is without question difficult for the provider, but disclosure to the patient is
necessary so that the provider may appropriately be held liable if the patient has been
harmed.211 However, the fact that a provider made an error does not give the patient
license to delve into the provider’s quality assurance work. If the patient is given that
206. This is not true for near miss incidents in which an error almost happens but is averted, either

intentionally or not. It is unfortunate, although perhaps not entirely surprising, that some studies have
found that doctors routinely do not report errors to patients. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 154, at
370–71.
207. Furrow, supra note 62, at 12–14; Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1071; Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and

Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1447, 1452 (2000).
208. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1072 (quoting Lucian Leape, Forward to Disclosing Medical Errors: A

Guide to an Effective Explanation and Apology, v–vi (Joint Commission Res. 2007)); see also
American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions With
Annotations, –, 242 (2006). Aside from being an ethical imperative, it is essential to keep
patients informed to provide dignified and informed care. Peter A. Clark, Medication Errors in Family
Practice, in Hospitals and After Discharge from the Hospital: An Ethical Analysis, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics
349, 354 (2004) (arguing that a mandatory reporting system is a way to ensure the autonomy and dignity
of patients).
209. See, e.g., Lamb et al., supra note 164; see also Cohen, supra note 207 (reviewing risks and benefits of

apology).
210. See Cohen, supra note 207, at 1458.
211. Clearly, this view portrays the ideal. See Andrews, supra note 154, at 362 (noting that “some physicians

in the [author’s] study indicated that they did not include information about errors in the patient’s chart
because they wanted to avoid litigation”).
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access, our cycle of medical error will undoubtedly continue. Patients must unequivocally be denied access to the incident report; medical record completion and
disclosure must be strictly enforced.
Much is made of the fact that hospitals ought to report to enhance accountability
and to improve quality of care.212 By creating a data repository where errors can be
analyzed, hospitals will be better able to examine their mistakes as well as to learn
from the mistakes of others. And at least twenty states already require hospitals to
report incidents, thereby improving accountability, particularly when hospitals that
fail to report are subject to sanctions.213 But reporting for its educational and regulatory value can easily be confused with reporting for punitive purposes. Attempts to
use the incident report for something other than its intended purpose of quality assurance ignores the fact that hospitals cannot keep the evidence of an error to
themselves and hinders vital quality assurance activities.214 Hospitals must provide
the plaintiff with access to the facts underlying the case, but they must be allowed to
keep their quality of care information confidential.
In court, hospitals argue against disclosure of incident reports, citing attorneyclient privilege because they were confidential communications between attorney
and client, and attorney work product privilege as they were prepared in anticipation
of litigation.215 Making such an argument also does not halve the dual purpose of
the incident report (preparation for litigation and quality assurance) to one; in other
words, simply because the providers argue that the reports were prepared in anticipation of litigation does not mean that they were not also prepared for quality assurance
purposes internal to the hospital. It is problematic that incident reports get tied up
in litigation when their purpose ought to be for the hospital to conduct research on
its own failings, and to improve.
To improve the state of medical care, the hospital must not just be held accountable or found liable. Simply sanctioning or suing a hospital does little to further the
quality of care for the rest of the patients, because to adequately understand the mistake and protect future patients, the hospital must perform a thorough self-evaluation
that includes honestly analyzing its mistakes.216 That analysis should be kept confidential.

212. See generally To Err Is Human, supra note 83; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force,

supra note 14.
213. See, e.g., Leape, supra note 80.
214. Further research needs to be done to compare actual quality of health care in states that give access to

incident reports as opposed to states that keep incident reports confidential. More thorough analysis of
reporting statistics, as well as whether errors are repeated, can shed light on whether allowing access to
incident reports hinders the improvement of health care to more patients than the one affected by the
error. While it is generally assumed that the mandatory collection of error data (or collection of error
data in general) improves the overall quality and safety of hospital care, recent studies have put this into
question. Liang, supra note 29, at 348.
215. See, e.g., Flynn v. Univ. Hospital, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1300 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
216. Dollar, supra note 5.
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As the Department of Health and Human Services completes its promulgation
of the PSQIA regulations,217 it will likely take into consideration the incident report’s dual purposes of reporting and self-analysis.218 Much of the impetus for the
PSQIA was a recognition that to encourage providers to report an error, there needed
to be assurance that the reports would be kept confidential.219 The proposed regulations address this by proposing civil money penalties of up to $10,000 for breach of
confidentiality provisions by disclosing patient safety work product to third parties.220 Ultimately, though, it seems that the PSQIA will not go far enough, as
hospitals in some states, such as those in Florida, need protection for all of their incident reporting activities and not just those that are reported to the PSO. In
addition, in states that require providers to report, reporting to yet another agency
will likely be burdensome, particularly when the incentive of confidentiality does not
help where help is needed. The federal law needs a broader preemption to be able to
include all hospitals in all states, and to actually have some measure of success. This
could arguably take management of health away from the state, but would improve
health care for the country as a whole, and, like the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 does for employers, would ultimately simplify things for hospital systems.221 Instead of having to worry about several different layers of reporting
they could worry about one.222 Physician licensing and hospital accountability could
still remain under state law, but reporting of incidents should be directly and only to
the federal government, which could then relay relevant information to states with
recommendations for sanctions but without disclosure of the report itself. Nothing
should be withheld from the patient except the hospital’s own self-evaluation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Medical errors continue to occur despite increased public awareness and pressure
from parts of society to improve the healthcare delivery system. However, improvement cannot be made until providers feel confident that reporting errors will not lead
to increased liability. One step towards achieving this improvement is the reimagining of incident reports—documents that compile the results of a hospital’s
investigation into what went wrong—from something other than a tool for a plaintiff ’s attorney. Instead, they should be thought of as what they actually are: research
217. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8112. The proposed rules were released on

February 12, 2008, for a period of public comment.
218. The Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Health and Human Services was given the

authority to promulgate regulations under the PSQIA in May 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 28701, 28701–
28702 (May 17, 2006).
219. See Furrow, supra note 62, at 17.
220. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
222. See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 62, at 18 (“State mandatory reporting systems . . . may also cause

inconsistencies and result in confusing procedures and inaccurate data, or not data collected at all.”).
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for the hospital into its own failings so that it can improve, and so that ultimately all
healthcare consumers may benefit from this reflective, self-evaluative process.
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